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Abstract.  Previous research has identified design principles that enable survivability for 
systems, but it is unclear if these principles are appropriate and sufficient for systems of 
systems as well.   This paper presents a preliminary examination of how some of the 
characteristic properties of systems of systems may enable or hinder survivability, based on 
existing design principles and a newly proposed taxonomy of disturbances.   Two new design 
principles, defensive posture and adaptation, are introduced.  The next phase of research will be 
to conduct empirical studies to validate the design principles against some of the characteristic 
properties of systems of systems, and test hypotheses about how survivability will be affected. 
Introduction 
As systems complexity grows, traditional systems are being interconnected to form larger, 
more capable systems of systems (SoS).  In many circumstances, systems of systems are 
operated in contexts that are subject to disturbances which may impact the ability of the SoS to 
deliver value.  Increasing the survivability of systems can be expensive, and typically involves 
tradeoffs.  Decision makers are forced to select options that balance value, cost and risk 
according to their needs, but in systems of systems, the problem is often compounded due to 
diverse stakeholders and conflicting risk mitigation strategies (Ellison and Woody 2007).  
Systems engineering design principles to aid designing systems for enhanced survivability 
were developed in a previous research effort (Richards 2009),  but the case studies upon which 
they were developed and validated, involved traditional systems, such as satellite radar.  There 
has been some debate as to whether traditional systems engineering methods and practices are 
still valid at the SoS level (Dickerson 2009) .  The literature is unclear as to the definition of a 
SoS, and how it is distinct from a traditional system (Chattopadhyay 2008).  This is not 
surprising, since the definitions of a “system” itself is also ambiguous (Backlund 2000).  
However, systems of systems can be thought of as a special case of systems, and thus it is 
important to highlight the characteristic properties of a SoS, and determine how they might 
affect its survivability.  Unfortunately, the concept of survivability upon which the original 
design principles were generated, was based upon a definition of disturbances that was 
insufficient for many of the types of problems a SoS may face.   Since systems of systems tend 
to be larger, more complex and operate under more varied contexts than traditional systems, a 
broader definition of disturbances is needed. 
 
This paper has two goals; (1) To point out deficiencies in the existing classification of 
disturbances and propose a new taxonomy, and (2) generate hypotheses as to whether or not 
some of the characteristic properties of systems of systems affect its survivability.  The paper 
begins with the existing definition of survivability and original design principles that enable it 
for systems. 
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Survivability 
Survivability is defined as the ability of a system to minimize the impact of a finite-duration 
disturbance on value delivery  (Richards et al. 2007; Richards 2009) (Figure 1).  Value can 
be thought of as the net utility (benefit) a system provides to its stakeholders (Keeney 1996).  
Systems can achieve survivability in three ways (Westrum 2006): (1) reducing the probability 
that a disturbance will impact the system, known as a system susceptibility (2) reducing the 
amount of value lost directly as a result of a disturbance occurring, known as a system 
vulnerability, and (3) increasing the system‟s ability to make a timely recovery from a 
disturbance, known as system resilience. 
 
 
Figure 1: Definition of Survivability (Richards, 2009) 
Richards (2009) generated a set of 17 design principles that can enhance the survivability of 
systems (Table 1).  Most of these design principles are examined against the properties that 
distinguish a SoS from a traditional system and hypotheses about their impact on system 
survivability are made.  However, since survivability is about avoiding, mitigating and 
recovering from disturbances, it is essential to define and characterize exactly what is and isn‟t 
a disturbance. 
Table 1: Design Principles for Survivability (from Richards 2009) 
Design 
Principle 
Phase of 
Survivability 
Definition Example 
Prevention Reduce 
Susceptibility 
Suppression of a future or 
potential future disturbance 
Destroying the weapons 
manufacturing capability of an 
enemy 
Mobility Reduce 
Susceptibility 
Relocation to avoid detection 
by an external change agent 
Iraqi Scud missile launchers 
moving during the Gulf war to 
avoid detection by U.S. forces 
Concealment Reduce 
Susceptibility 
Reduction of the visibility of 
a system from an external 
change agent 
Stealth technology on the F=117 
Nighthawk 
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Deterrence Reduce 
Susceptibility 
Dissuasion of a rational 
external change agent from 
committing a disturbance 
Mutual Assured Destruction 
during the Cold War 
Preemption Reduce 
Susceptibility 
Suppression of an imminent 
disturbance 
Using Patriot missiles to shoot 
down Scud missiles during Gulf 
War 
Avoidance Reduce 
Susceptibility 
Maneuverability away from 
an ongoing disturbance 
Changing flight path to fly around 
a thunderstorm 
Hardness Reduce 
Vulnerability 
Resistance of a system to 
deformation 
M1 Abrams tank armor 
Redundancy Reduce 
Vulnerability 
Duplication of Critical 
System Functions 
Back-up GEO communications 
satellites 
Margin Reduce 
Vulnerability 
The allowance of extra 
capability for maintaining 
value delivery despite losses. 
Long, low-set wings on the A-10 
that are able to fly even if half of it 
is missing (lift margin) 
Heterogeneity Reduce 
Vulnerability 
Variation in system elements 
to mitigate homogeneous 
disturbances 
Nuclear “triad” of ICBMs, 
airborne bombers and nuclear 
submarines 
Distribution Reduce 
Vulnerability 
Separation of critical system 
elements to mitigate local 
disturbances 
Two mechanical assemblies 
functionally and spatially 
separated on A-10 
Failure Mode 
Reduction 
Reduce 
Vulnerability 
Elimination of system 
hazards through intrinsic 
design 
Replacement of Teflon insulation 
in the oxygen tank with stainless 
steel following Apollo 13 
Fail-safe Reduce 
Vulnerability 
Prevention or delay of 
system degradation by 
leveraging the physic of 
incipient failure 
Autorotation of rotor blade in the 
Blackhawk 
Evolution Reduce 
Vulnerability 
Alteration of system 
elements to reduce 
disturbance effectiveness 
B-17 design and tactics evolving 
during WWII 
Replacement Increase 
Resilience 
Substitution of system 
elements to improve value 
delivery 
XM-3 and XM-4 satellites 
replacing XM-1 and XM-2. 
Repair Increase 
Resilience 
Restoration of a system to an 
improved state of value 
delivery 
STS-61 mission placing 
COSTAR on the Hubble Space 
Telescope 
Disturbances 
Intuitively, a disturbance is something bad (Jackson 2010), that may negatively impact a 
system‟s ability to deliver value.  To distinguish survivability from other related “ilities”, 
Richards (2009) classified disturbances along two axes; (1) whether the origin was internal or 
external to the system , and (2) whether the disturbance was natural / accidental or malevolent.  
Survivability of systems was defined to be unique among the “-ilities”, as it was only 
concerned with disturbances that were external to the system, regardless of whether they were 
natural / accidental or malevolent (Figure 2).  These distinctions are important, because 
system designers have to select the appropriate design principles corresponding to the 
disturbance.  However, disturbances have other important characteristics beyond intent and 
place of origin that should be considered as well.  In this section, a taxonomy of disturbances in 
introduced, which distinguishes disturbances based on their origin, nature, intent, duration, and 
effect on context. 
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Figure 2: Difference between Survivability and other “-ilities" (Richards, 2009) 
Origin of Disturbances.  Disturbances can be either internal (endogenous) or external 
(exogenous) to the system.  It is interesting to note, that disturbances between systems within a 
SoS, are considered internal to the SoS overall.  However, these same disturbances would 
likely be considered exogenous to the individual constituent systems.       
  
Nature of Disturbance.  Disturbances can be either natural or artificial.  Natural disturbances 
are those that arise from the interaction of the system with the natural environment.  Floating 
debris and thunderstorms are examples of natural disturbances that could affect the value 
delivered by a SoS under consideration.  Even something as seemingly trivial as a bird striking 
an aircraft can have serious consequences (Kelly 2009).  Artificial disturbances, like missile 
attacks or policy changes, arise from the actions of external agents.   
 
Intent.  (Ellison et al. 1997) classifies disturbances as attacks, failures and accidents.  When 
external agents are involved, it is necessary to consider their intent, in order for the appropriate 
survivability principles to be applied.  Attacks are events, such as a missile attack, caused by 
intelligent adversaries with malevolent intent.  Failures are events caused by deficiencies in the 
system or in an external entity upon which the system depends whereas accidents are randomly 
generated events outside the system.  However, this classification does not include 
disturbances generated intentionally by external agents without malevolent intent.  An example 
of this type of disturbance would be government agency raising the threat level.  Even if this 
entity realizes the harm that this disturbance could cause (the DHS, for instance, acknowledges 
the negative impact of raising the threat level stating that it has "economic, physical, and 
psychological effects on the nation”  (DHS 2010)), it is not done with malevolent intent.  
Instead, the external agency chooses to exercise this option, when considering objectives and 
attributes beyond those of the system itself.    
 
Disturbance Duration.  Disturbances can vary in duration, from instantaneous events to very 
lengthy disturbances. 
 
Context Change.  While a disturbance is occurring, the context in which the system operates is 
changes.  However, after the disturbance is over, the context may or may not return to what it 
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was previously.  Sometimes, a finite duration disturbance can cause a permanent context 
change.  For instance, while the hijackings of 9/11 were finite in duration, the changes they 
caused in airline security are still there 10 years later. 
The taxonomy of disturbances discussed above is applied to a set of example disturbances in 
Table 2. 
Table 2: Classifying Example Disturbances using Disturbance Taxonomy 
Example Disturbance Origin Nature Duration Context 
Change 
Intent 
Lightning strike External Natural Short Temporary Accident 
Missile attack External Artificial Short Temporary Attack 
Policy change External Artificial Short Permanent Intentional 
Sudden increase in boats 
arriving 
External Artificial Short Temporary Accident 
Component failure in 
vehicle 
Internal Natural Short Temporary Accident 
Climate change External Natural Long Permanent Accident 
Obstacle in path of 
vehicles 
External Either Short Temporary Accident 
Operator error Internal Artificial Short Temporary Accident 
Biological virus External Natural Short Temporary / 
Permanent 
Intentional 
Changes in system form Internal Artificial Short / 
Long 
Temporary / 
Permanent 
Intentional 
/ Accident 
Fuel prices increase External Artificial Long Permanent Intentional 
Technology improvement External Artificial Short Permanent Intentional 
Bad communications Internal Artificial Short Permanent Accident 
Properties that Distinguish Systems of Systems from Traditional 
Systems 
The literature has identified several characteristics of systems of systems that tend to set 
them apart from traditional, „monolithic‟ systems (Jamshidi 2009).  Having one or more of 
these characteristics does not necessarily make a system a SoS.  In fact, debating whether a 
particular system is actually SoS or not, may be moot; what is important is that system 
designers, architects and analysts recognize whether or not the system under investigation has 
some of these SoS-like properties, and apply design principles and methodologies accordingly.  
Some of these characteristics include operational independence,  managerial independence, 
geographical distribution of components, evolutionary development  (Maier 1998), 
multi-functionality  (Eisner, Marciniak, and McMillan 1991), distributed authority,  abstruse 
emergence (Boardman and Sauser 2006),  internal interoperability and dubious validation 
(Ellison and Woody 2007). 
 
Component Independence.  A component of a system is any entity within a system, whether 
it is a system itself (referred to as a constituent system) or some other supporting element (such 
connecting wires).    Components have operational independence if they can operate outside 
the system and still produce value, whereas they have managerial independence if they 
actually do operate independently from the other components.    Components that operate 
independently of other components and produce value on their own, would typically be 
considered constituent systems of the overall SoS. 
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Distributed Authority.   In order for systems to have managerial independence, they need to 
be able to make decisions for themselves.  Thus, many systems of systems tend to have 
distributed authority, whereas traditional systems are more likely to have central authority.  
However, distributed authority does not guarantee managerial independence, if decisions are 
made collectively.  
 
Geographic Separation.  Components in traditional systems tend to be more co-located that 
those in systems of systems. Operational and managerial independence of systems of systems 
facilitates geographically separated components, where decisions based on local context can 
occur. 
 
Multi-Functionality.  A simple, traditional system is more likely to have a single function or 
purpose, whereas a system of system is more likely to be multi-functional.  For instance, UAV 
A may be designed to detect targets, UAV B may be designed to take pictures of targets and 
UAV C may be designed to identify targets.  The function of the SoS is to provide situational 
awareness, which is the aggregate of all functions of its components (detect, photograph and 
identify targets).  
 
Increased Contextual Diversity.  Since components in systems of systems are more likely to 
be physically separated than those in traditional systems, it follows that they will be more likely 
to be operating under different environmental conditions.  Furthermore, because of managerial 
independence, components in a SoS are also more likely to be operated with different 
stakeholder needs and expectations.  Therefore, components within a SoS are more likely to be 
operating under heterogeneous contexts, than components within a traditional system 
(Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Traditional Systems and Systems of Systems 
Decreased System Awareness.    Since components in a system of system are often operating 
under different contexts, they must share the contextual information with each other in a timely 
manner, for all of the components to have the same system awareness at any given time.  In 
order for that to happen, three things must occur; (1) the important differences in context must 
be apparent, (2) stakeholders must be willing to share this information (not always the case, 
particularly if the contextual differences are the stakeholder preferences and policies), and (3)  
mechanisms must exist for this information to be shared in a timely manner.  For these reasons, 
components within systems of systems that operate under different contexts may be operating 
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under incorrect or incomplete information about the system itself, than components within 
traditional systems operating under the same context. 
 
Evolutionary Development.  Traditional systems are typically assembled during 
implementation, before the system is operated.  Components of systems of systems, are often 
added or removed dynamically, during the operation of the SoS, and are considered to be 
constantly evolving.  
 
Abstruse Emergence.  In traditional systems, emergent behavior is often part of the design (or 
at least expected), and as such, is usually a benefit overall.  In systems of systems, particularly 
those with evolutionary development, emergent behaviors are more difficult to predict and 
often end up being problematic. 
 
Internal Interoperability.  Since traditional systems tend to have more holistic designs with 
specialized components, interoperability is usually only an issue when interfacing with 
external systems. Components within a SoS, however, are often constituent systems that must 
interoperate with each other.  With evolutionary development, these constituent systems are 
often designed and operated independently and newer constituent systems from one supplier 
must often interface with legacy constituent systems form another supplier.  While standards 
often exist, they are not always strictly enforced and interoperability within the SoS can 
become a major concern. 
 
Dubious Validation.  Due primarily to the evolutionary development of systems of systems, 
testing and validation becomes increasingly difficult.  Components often change and it is not 
practical to validate each change with every possible permutation of components past, present 
and future, particularly when the components are designed and operated by different 
stakeholders.  While interoperability standards typically exist, systems of systems are less 
likely to be held to the same rigorous testing and validation procedures as traditional systems. 
Discussion on SoS Properties and Their Impact on Survivability 
Reducing Susceptibility.  It is important to distinguish intentional disturbances from 
unintentional, because there are several survivability design principles systems can take to 
reduce susceptibility by preventing attacks, such as deterrence, prevention and preemption.  
These principles will be ineffective, however, if the disturbances are unintentional.  Since 
many systems of systems involve a large sociotechnical component (Bjelkemyr, Semere, and 
Lindberg 2007), they will more likely be impacted by disturbances which are side effects of 
polices.  For instance, a raise in taxes on gasoline may impact a transportation systems ability 
to survive.  A new survivability design principle may be needed where the system somehow 
influences policy makers away from creating disturbances that will impact its survivability.  
  
A system that has components located in geographically disparate areas and operating under 
multiple contexts is more likely to encounter some disturbance than one that is co-located and 
operating under a single context.  Suppose the probability of a particular disturbance d, over a 
period of time t, for a particular environment (context) c is given by    .  For a traditional 
system, with all of its components collocated, then the probability    of this particular 
disturbance impacting the system over time period t will be    . However, for a SoS that has 
components in n separate contexts that are different enough for the risk of disturbance to be 
independent, then the probability of that disturbance affecting at least one component is given 
by  
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As an example, suppose every hour there is a 1% chance that a thunderstorm will affect any 
particular location in the world.  If two ground control stations are located far away from each 
other, then the probability that at least one of them is affected by a thunderstorm becomes 
(  (      ) )       or twice the probability of a co-located traditional system.  Thus, 
without considering anything else, geographical distribution may make systems more 
susceptible to disturbances simply because they are more likely to be exposed to multiple 
contexts simultaneously.  On the other hand, geographical distribution reduces susceptibility in 
a number of ways.  By physically separating components, critical components can be located in 
safer environments.  For instance, UAV operators can be located far away from hostile 
environments where the UAVs themselves operate, following the avoidance design principle.   
Also, operational and managerial independence of the components allows systems to act and 
react to their environments dynamically.  This, coupled with geographical separation of critical 
and expendable components, facilitates prevention, preemption and deterrence design 
principles.  For instance, an expendable UAV may discover a hostile boat while on patrol and 
be able to preemptively attack it without waiting for a central authority figure (who may be 
overwhelmed) to give approval, or allowing it to get into range of the non-expendable ground 
control stations. 
 
Reducing Vulnerability.  Obviously, geographical separation fully adheres to the 
survivability design principles of distribution and containment, thereby decreasing 
vulnerability to local disturbances.  If the two ground control stations are separated 
geographically, then a disturbance that affects one, such as missile strike, may not impact the 
other.    
 
Endogenous disturbances (i.e. internal to the system), such as component failure, are not 
survivability issues as they are reliability issues.    Naturally, an exogenous disturbance, such as 
a missile strike, can cause a chain of events to occur that causes failure within a system.  
Perhaps the biggest drawback of a highly connected, interdependent system is a 
cascading-failure, where the failure of one component, causes failure in the next, and so on, 
similar to dominoes.  This type of failure is responsible for some of the biggest systems of 
systems failures, such as the Northeast Blackout of 2003 (Andersson et al. 2005).  Although it 
is often reliability issues that cause the cascading failure to propagate through the system, this 
is still a survivability issue since it was instigated by an external disturbance.  Thus, reliability 
of a system is part of survivability.   However, in systems of systems, the distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous disturbances is blurred.  In traditional systems, most individual 
components tend not to have an external interface.  Thus, the environment only interacts with a 
limited set of components, or the entire system as a whole.  In a SoS, the components are 
themselves systems and interact with each other through interfaces that are external to the 
component systems, but internal to the SoS.  Thus, the inputs to a system within a SoS are 
exogenous and therefore related to the survivability of that system, even if the inputs come 
from other components within the SoS.  Thus, the survivability of constituent components is 
almost a pre-requisite for SoS reliability (unless the system has redundancy built-in)..  
The hardness of highly-connected systems will likely be reduced, since outputs of a system 
become inputs to another and therefore potential disturbances.   Furthermore, overall reliability 
within the system may be reduced due to the fact that the connections of systems that have been 
likely engineered by different companies may not be as interoperable as a traditional, cohesive 
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system.  This means that the fail-safe and failure mode reduction survivability design 
principles will likely be harder to reach in a SoS, thereby making it more vulnerable to 
disturbances. 
 
Multi-function systems support the design principle of heterogeneity, since alternate methods 
of providing value to the stakeholders are possible in the event that a disturbance impacts ones 
of more of the functions that the SoS provides. 
Intuitively, evolutionary development would likely make a system less vulnerable to 
disturbances, since the system has (in its past) functioned with or without certain components 
or capabilities.  Therefore, it is more likely that a SoS will be able to survive if a disturbance 
impacts it in such a way that the system still resembles one of its intermediary stages.  An 
example would be that a couple of UAVs can be added or removed from the SoS under 
consideration at any time and it would still function (although at different performance levels).  
Thus, if a missile attacks shoots down one of the UAVs, the SoS will likely survive.  This most 
closely follows the principle of margin, since there would more likely be extra capability in a 
SoS than in a traditional system, due to evolutionary development and functional intermediate 
stages. To deal with the important issue of interoperability, perhaps the success of the Internet 
is a good place for inspiration.  For instance, the robustness principle, known as one of the 
essential design principles of the Internet (Rosenthal 2010) might be a worthy addition to the 
set of system design principle for survivability, particularly when applied to systems of 
systems.  The robustness principle, first introduced by Jon Postel in 1981 and also sometimes 
known as Postel’s Law, can be summarized as the following: 
 
Be conservative in what you send, liberal in what you receive 
 
In other words, when sending information to other components, always ensure that the 
component is strictly following standards and protocols.  However, when receiving 
information from other components, always assume that there are errors and try to handle them 
as well as possible.  This principle is referred to as a defensive posture by Ellison and Woody 
(2007). 
 
Increasing System Resilience.  Of the original 17 system design principles for survivability, 
only repair and replace increased the third type of survivability; system resilience. 
Independence of components and evolutionary development facilitates both of these 
principles, since the system tends to keep operating independently while the number and 
configuration of components change.  While repairing and replacing components will likely 
allow systems to recover from finite duration disturbances, they are less likely to restore value 
delivery in the presence of a permanent context change.   For this, a new design principle 
adaptation could be useful.  Given enough time, systems that have an evolutionary nature and 
the ability to operate with a dynamic set of components, will be more likely to be able to 
change in form and/or operation, in order continue to deliver acceptable value to the 
stakeholders (Sage and Cuppan 2001).  
 
Perhaps one of the greatest drawbacks to some of the key SoS characteristics, such as 
managerial independence and geographical separation, is reduced system awareness.  
Although this problem potentially affects all three types of survivability, it particularly 
increases system vulnerability by creating internal disruptions, and reduces system resilience, 
by hindering a timely and coordinated response to an unanticipated disturbance. 
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Conclusions 
When comparing the set of properties that distinguish a SoS from a traditional system and 
applying the set of design principles for survivability, it appears that systems of systems are 
more likely to be more survivable, due primarily to the properties of operational and 
managerial independence, geographical separation, and evolutionary development.  This 
would concur with the notion that loosely coupled systems are inherently more survivable 
(Jackson 2010).  However, reduced system awareness can increase vulnerability and decrease 
resilience, to the point where overall SoS survivability may actually be worse than a traditional 
system.  Making generalizations about systems of systems is dangerous, as many systems 
exhibit some properties of both traditional systems and systems of systems.  It is not 
recommended that a new set of design principles for systems of systems be created; rather, the 
existing system survivability design principles should be modified and augmented to address 
the differences between various systems.  In addition to the two new design principles 
introduced in this paper, more design principles should be explored.  For instance, Huynh et al. 
(2009) suggest that systems are more likely to be robust if the components are similar.  This 
assertion, which needs to be tested in a systems context,  is based on a similarity principle in 
chemistry that which states that mixtures of similar components will have a higher entropy and 
be more stable than mixtures of dissimilar components (Lin 2008).  The next phase of this 
research is to conduct simulations of systems of systems that are subjected to various 
disturbances of the proposed taxonomy.  The goal will be to compare designs that have or have 
not used the proposed design principles, and validate some of the hypotheses made in this 
paper.   Following the analysis of the results, and using historical case studies as a reference, 
existing and new system survivability design principles will be validated and updated 
accordingly for some of the characteristic properties of systems of systems. 
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